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Pictorial Theories of Global Politics: Why anarchy has retained its 
paradigmatic position.  
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract: It has recently been pointed out that Kenneth Waltz based his seminal theorization 
of anarchy on a pictorial view of theories as essentially ‘pictures, mentally formed’ and that 
this provides his main buttress against theoretical criticism. This paper asks what other 
pictorial theories are in operation in the discipline and finds surprisingly few. Copious 
criticism of ‘anarchy’ as a theory has not resulted in a host of rival pictorial theories of 
world politics being developed and the lack of rival ‘theories’ leaving critics dependent upon 
anarchy. The paper begins with a note on the pictorial understanding of what a theory is 
before it investigates alternatives including hierarchy, anarchy, empire and network. It 
concludes that anarchy and hierarchy remain the only two pictorial theories of political 
structure in town and that this is a constraining factor in the development of fresh theoretical 
perspectives on world politics. The example of the Global Polity Approach which aimed to 
start from a new unit of analysis but lacked precisely its own pictorial theory of political 
structure is offered as a demonstration of the power of the unchallenged model of anarchy.  
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In a recent article Ole Waever examines Kenneth Waltz‟s theory of theory, pointing out how 
the seminal work Theory of International Relations subscribes to a particular „pictorial‟ idea 
of what a theory is (Waever 2009). This is a long overdue reflection on what kind of a thing it 
is that IR scholars have been fighting over for now over 30 years. A „theory‟ in this sense is 
not the same as a general approach such as constructivism or Marxism and would also differ 
from „laws‟ e.g. that democracies do not go to war with each other. Laws establish a relation 
between variables, whereas a theory, following Waltz (who was following an emerging post-
positivist consensus at the time) can be thought of as a „picture, mentally formed, of a 
bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain 
and the connections among its parts‟ (Waltz 1979: 8 – emphasis added). According to this 
idea (apparently quite standard in the philosophy of the natural sciences (Frigg 2006)) models 
or graphic representations do not simply illustrate a theory but in some ways are the theory 
(2009). Since this pictorial theory of theory provides the foundations of what is widely 
regarded as the most influential theory in the discipline, understanding why Waltz preferred 
this theory of theory and how it influenced his extremely powerful articulation of structural 
realism is, as Waever points out, fascinating for its own sake and crucial for understanding 
how Waltz currently defends the theory. But it also raises the question of what other pictorial 
theories there are available in the discipline, which in many ways remains so very 
circumscribed by the model of anarchy and the debate about it. Waever also notes, for 
instance, that most of Waltz‟ „grandchildren‟ have not tackled his theory at this level, mostly 
articulating theory of a kind he specifically warned against (looking for laws from empirical 
patterns, for example). To this can be added that Waltz‟s critics have also not tended to 
articulate alternative theories of political structure content instead with criticizing Waltz‟ 
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specification of anarchy, or dismissing the idea of structural models all together. 
Neoliberalism famously accepted the structural model of anarchy but added institutions, non-
state actors and focussed on cooperation where and when it happened. Wendtian 
constructivism sought to provide a different ontology to anarchy but remained focussed on 
anarchy as a social structure. English School writers saw an anarchic system but also a 
international society underpinning this (Bull 1977) and recently the idea of a world society 
has been developed further (Buzan 2004). Again no alternative pictorial model of political 
structure is explored or promised. Post-structuralists have revealed the discourses behind 
anarchy and deconstructed them and their pivotal concepts such as sovereignty and national 
security, pointing to the contingent and political nature  of these (Walker 1993, Bartelson 
1995, Campbell 1998). Post-internationalist perspectives such as that of James Rosenau 
(1990, 1997) and Ferguson and Mansbach (2006), Mansbach (2000) continue to provide 
copious criticisms of the model of an anarchy of states pointing to the many „changes‟ in the 
international system and  complications that make the idea of a system of neatly ordered 
sovereign states in a system more a myth than reality. But these descriptions are again based 
on the model of anarchy and make sense in relation to that in a „post-this‟ „non-that‟ mode of 
thinking that leans on the very model that it hits out at. Anarchy still seems to be posing the 
questions, even when it is not given as the answer.  
 
After all the years of debate and criticism of Theory of International Politics  this observation 
raises the surprising question of what – or even whether – other „theories‟ or political 
structure in the pictorial sense are in operation in the discipline of International Relations 
(IR). Waltz himself claimed that societies can either be hierarchical or anarchical and that 
mixtures of anarchy and hierarchy do not constitute a third kind (1979). Much critical  has 
been said about this assertion, and the idea that hierarchy and anarchy are the only theories of 
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International Relations (IR) will rightly seem preposterous if by „theory‟ we mean any work 
that departs from mere description. However, if „theory‟ is used more particularly in the 
pictorial sense as a „picture, mentally formed‟ that allows a delineated field to be understood, 
then the question of an alternative model of political structure for grouping units and 
understanding their dynamics has at any rate been attempted surprisingly little. Most 
alternative notions of political structure such as suzerainity (Watson 1992)  heterarchy 
(Ruggie 1998) or hegemony (Watson 1992) locate themselves upon a continuum between the 
ideal types of hierarchy and anarchy or constitute a mixture of the two. Furthermore, in 
rejecting the theory of anarchy as incomplete or misleading, critics of neorealism have very 
often rejected the very idea of models as ways of simplifying complex reality concerning 
political structure. Theories of anarchy and parsimony have been viewed as two sides of the 
same coin. This has left little in the way of simplifying tools for heterodox scholars to reach 
for when describing global politics –  hence the penchant for complexity and network 
metaphors such as the „complex interdependence‟ (Keohane and Nye) „fuzzy borders‟ 
(Christiansen) or the „nebuleuse‟ (Cox). Moreover, this lack of rivals for hierarchy and 
particularly anarchy, I would venture, provides part of the explanation as to why Waltz‟s 
structural theory of anarchy still holds such paradigmatic sway within the discipline: 
additions and complications to the standard model stand little chance of displacing the model 
of anarchy, just as a scientific paradigm in Kuhn‟s sense can survive even huge amounts of 
falsification so long as a rival theory is not presented (Kuhn 1962). 
 
 
This article surveys the theoretical landscape of IR at precisely this level of theory as 
pictures,  mentally formed. Although this definition of theory appears idiosyncratic and can 
easily be dismissed as too limited, dismissing its significance and failing to apply it as a 
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prism for viewing other theories of world politics so would obscure an important point: 
scholars will be very familiar with claims about the conditions of hierarchy and the logic of 
anarchy, while those challenging that dichotomy within IR have largely had to make do with 
emphasising the breakdown, corruption and transformation of existing or traditional (state) 
boundaries, the crossing of the domestic-foreign frontier, the mythical nature of the Inside-
Outside distinction
 (Walker 1993) or with positing notions of „turbulence‟ or the compound 
term „fragmegration‟ (Rosenau 1990, 1997) or other non-model concepts such as „complex 
multilateralism‟ which operate within existing discourses of International Relations. The 
scenario of an undergraduate student of IR pronouncing on „the logic of [something other 
than anarchy]‟ is not easily conjured up, or not in my mind, at least. The whole post-
international approach is dedicated to – even defined by – showing how the model of the 
international system falls short because the system either never was a neat anarchy of 
hierarchical states or is changing and becoming more complex with the addition of other 
actors and institutions. To some degree the discipline of IR is defined by the use of the 
„theory‟ of anarchy even if much of the discipline is hostile to the model. This tension is 
dogging the discipline while probably also preventing it from becoming a subdiscipline of 
World or Global Politics, that could be imagined as a discipline with multiple pictorial 
theories of political structure. 
 
 
The paper begins with a note on the pictorial understanding of what a theory is before it 
investigates alternatives to anarchy currently deployed in IR including hierarchy, anarchy, 
empire and network. Finally it is suggested that this notion of theory potentially provides a 
way of organizing theories of world politics that does not rely on the anarchy-fixated history 
of the discipline of IR that helps perpetuate its narrow theoretical focus and prevents it from 
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evolving into Global Politics. So far, however, it concludes that anarchy and hierarchy remain 
the only two pictorial theories of political structure in town and that this is a constraining 
factor in the development of fresh theoretical perspectives on world politics such as the 
Global Polity Approach which lack a unit of analysis that is different from hierarchy and 
anarchy. 
 
Theory 
Theory is many things to many people. To answer the question of what theories of global 
politics we have at our disposal, we first need to consider briefly what is meant here by a 
theory. While the main thrust of the argument in this paper challenges Kenneth Waltz‟ claim 
that there can be only two basic theoretical models of political structure applicable for politics 
in a society – anarchy or hierarchy  – his consideration of what a theory actually is, though 
flawed, is potentially useful. In his book Theory of International Politics, Waltz (1979) 
expends some considerable energy on defining what he thinks a theory is, presenting a 
relatively well defined ‟theory of theory‟ (see Wæver 2009) not least compared to other 
theory-builders in the discipline who either do not discuss what a theory is, or treat it 
summarily (e.g. Lebow 2008). As mentioned he argues that a theory is or should be thought 
of as a „picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a 
depiction of the organization of a domain and the connections among its parts‟ (Waltz 1979: 
8).  
 
This definition, though not uncontentious, has three main elements relevant for expanding the 
range of theories in circulation. Firstly, with the idea of a theory being „mentally formed‟ he 
rejects that theories can be inductively gleaned from data and thus that a new theory can only 
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arise if a new reality has emerged. A theory is distinct from reality and is arrived at by 
moving away from reality, not towards it: „to claim that it is possible to arrive at a theory 
inductively is to claim that we can understand phenomena before the means for their 
explanation are contrived‟ (Waltz 1979:7). Waltz quotes Albert Einstein‟s words that „there is 
no way from experience to the setting up of a theory‟ (ibid.). Of course this contains an 
element of polemics since theories are not grasped out of thin air but inspired by something, 
including (in some way) data and prior knowledge about a field, which must have been 
grasped using another theory. None the less, there must be an element of a „leap‟ from one 
theory to another as the movement to a new one cannot be bridged by evidence alone. Thus 
the creative aspect of theory-construction is emphasized by Waltz and this is an important 
point for anybody  aiming to begin afresh, unsatisfied with the arrangement and framing of 
evidence generated by the international system model. This also drives home the point that 
pointing out myriad symptoms of globalizing politics as post-internationalists have tended to, 
is not the same as developing an alternative theory of world politics.  
 
Secondly, Waltz points out that theories are also simplifications that help make sense of a 
certain limited field (1979, 2004). As a simplification a theory does not correspond exactly to 
the field it depicts (selecting elements of reality for the purpose of inquiry). Waltz is critical 
of political scientists who write of theoretical models as though they were of „the model 
airplane sort‟ (Waltz1979:7). If the problem with post-internationalism is its reliance on 
complexity and additional variables framed by the same underlying model of inter-state 
anarchy, then adopting this view of theory as a simplifying device is also a potentially useful 
antidote to simply amassing more anomalies in relation to the state system model. We are 
looking for a new simplification. Moreover, if simple correspondence is not the basis of a 
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theory the legitimacy of a new model is not tied to the idea of fundamental change in the 
world out there. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, for Waltz a theory is in an important way also „a 
picture‟: „A theory (…) is not a collection of variables‟ it is, literally, a depiction: 
 
Interviewer (Ole Wæver): So when you say theory is a „picture‟ mentally 
formed, „picture‟ is to be taken relatively literally. There is something graphic 
to it? 
 
Kenneth Waltz: Yes, it is a picture, but of course „mentally formed‟ / that is 
important too! (Waltz 2005 in Hansen & Wæver 2005).  
 
 
The pictorial idea of a theory is different from most commonsense understandings or politics 
textbook definitions which (usually implicitly) rest on the idea of a theory as a set of 
propositions about causes and effects, something Waltz rather considers to be a set of „laws‟. 
For Waltz, laws „establish relations between variables‟ but do not explain that relation 
(1979:1). For that we need theory. We can observe the regularity of sunrise and sunset, 
without understanding why they occur as they do: „rather than being mere collections of laws, 
theories are statements that explain them‟ (1979:5). Even though he uses the term 
„statements‟ here and his theory is of course also presented in textual form in Theory of 
International Politics, a central element of the theory is constituted by the diagram or model 
(Wæver 2009). For followers of such a picture-theoretic approach models always play an 
important role and to some extent „are‟ the theory: „it is models that are the primary (though 
by no means the only) representational tools in the sciences‟ (Giere 2004:747). 
 
The model-oriented theory of theory has grown in popularity in the philosophy of science 
literature, displacing the older „received‟ or syntactic view of theories as axiomatic 
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statements and laws, such that „it is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom 
that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge‟ (Frigg 
2006:49). Whether „theory‟ should be reserved solely for this level of theory is doubtful even 
for those pushing for a model-centric view of theory (Giere 2004:746). After all, at base, 
theory is simply „the task of making the world or some part of it more intelligible or better 
understood‟ (Viotti & Kauppi 1993:3). However, in this case, understanding theory in terms 
of a pictorial model that structures knowledge with a view to making the world more 
intelligible is useful because it shifts attention to a relatively neglected level of theory in the 
debate about IR and globalization. Compared to the huge debate on the need for 
supplementary variables to complement the Waltzian theory of states in anarchy populated 
by neoclassical realists and post-classical realists (Wivel 2000, Rose 1998, Escude 1998) as 
well as neoliberal institutionalists and post-internationalists (Nye & Keohane 1977, Keohane 
& Nye 1997), a wholly insignificant amount of energy has gone into developing alternative 
theories in the sense of pictures, mentally formed, to make sense of the structure of the field. 
Challenges to Waltz‟ theory have in other words generally not been at the level of theory as 
he understands it.  As Wæver puts it:  
 
Waltz‟s academic grandchildren build theory according to a positivist manual 
very far from chapter 1 of TIP [Theory of International Politics]. Not only do 
they violate his injunctions against add-ons to the theory (be that as it may, it is 
in some sense a tribute to his triumph: he has already said it all; we need to 
move on), they do not build the new theories in his style but adopt ideas of 
theory that he explicitly warned against‟ (Wæver 2009: 214) 
 
The idea of models structuring scientific knowledge „below‟ the level of statements also 
offers an understanding of why extensive liberal criticism of neorealist oversimplification has 
not unseated the model of anarchy as the dominant theory. Alternative laws and variables 
have been advanced, but not „theories‟. Complexity or additions of new variables in post-
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internationalism do not represent a new theory of international relations in the Waltzian 
sense. On the contrary they depend upon the same underlying model of the international 
system. Rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic would not have changed its course and 
saved it from calamity.  
 
If few have (or indeed if anybody has) built „new theories in [Waltz‟s] style‟ this may be in 
large part due to the way he hoisted the ladder up after himself. Hierarchy and anarchy are 
defined as each other‟s opposites and form a continuum creating the illusion that all the 
possibilities are contained between two ideal typical models and the scale that they define. 
Waltz warns his readers that „a new concept [beyond hierarchy and anarchy] should be 
introduced only to cover matters that existing concepts do not reach‟ (1979:116). Mixtures 
and borderline cases do not represent a third type: „To say that we have borderline cases is 
not to say that at the border a third type of system appears‟ (Waltz 1979:116). Given this, 
there may seem little point in looking for other theories of politics.  
 
However, Waltz seems to have forgotten his own theory of theory according to which 
theories consist mostly of omissions. If, as he writes, „the infinite materials of any realm can 
be organized in endlessly different ways‟, and theories are created not by induction from 
many observations but by the flash of „brilliant intuition‟ (1979:9), then there will always be 
scope for new theories, even without major change in society. There will by definition always 
be „matters that existing concepts do not reach‟ and hence always scope for the introduction 
of new theories. Of these we ask not „are they true‟ but „are they useful‟, as Waltz points out. 
 
Furthermore, while Waltz hails simplification as the source of a theory‟s strength, this is 
plainly also the source of weakness. Richard Ned Lebow‟s view of a social theory as a 
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construct that helps us structure and understand reality by describing the relationship between 
the parts and the whole (2008:42) has parallels with the Waltzian idea of a useful picture, 
mentally formed, depicting how units relate to each other. But Lebow more honestly admits 
that theories have a „down-side‟: „They ignore or dismiss certain problems, discourage 
certain kinds of inquiry and encourage the kind of cognitive constituency that leads us to 
assimilate discrepant information to our expectations‟ (Lebow 2008:34). If we are bound to 
simplify in order to explain or understand (Waltz), but simplification also distorts (Lebow), 
the best we can do is to have more theories at our disposal such that distortions balance each 
other or at least do not get reified as singular truths. We need to have a real choice about what 
aspects of reality we wish to select and understand.  
 
The argument of this paper is therefore not the usual Waltzian one – that post-
internationalism, by moving descriptively closer to reality by adding complications, loses 
explanatory power as such. To my mind, the problem is not the lack of parsimony (historical 
explanations and thick description are surely useful forms of explanation too). In any case the 
predictive power of the Waltzian structural theory (that anarchy forces balancing, for 
example) relies ultimately on discursive structures that cast identities an interests in a 
particular way (wendt1999). The problem for IR lies instead in the hidden reliance on the 
same theoretical model behind such „more accurate‟ descriptions that sacrifice parsimony: 
parsimonious monoculture, so to speak. A certain theory (anarchy) has monopolised the field 
providing the theoretical scaffolding even for descriptive „bunch of variables‟ theories of 
international relations including neoliberal and post-international critiques of the structural 
realist model of states in anarchy.  
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None the less, there are alternative theories (even in the Waltzian sense) already in circulation 
besides that of anarchy. „Hierarchy‟ is the obvious alternative model suggested by Waltz as 
theoretically possible in the international realm (in his dichotomy societies are hierarchical if 
they are not anarchical) but in practice this is unlikely, due amongst other things to the logic 
of balancing, which will tend to maintain a bi- or multi-polar anarchy. Most people, specialist 
or lay, would have little trouble drawing hierarchy pictorially in the classical pyramid shape 
with the sovereign at the top. Limited credence has traditionally been given to the idea of 
there being a global hierarchy, especially if this is taken to mean a global state. But the theory 
is out there and is beginning to be taken up anew (Wendt 2003, Shaw 2000, Ougaard 2004, 
Weiss 2009). That said, until now, anarchy has ruled fairly supremely, challenged mainly by 
generally non-pictorial notions of complexity e.g. „complex interdependence‟ (Keohane and 
Nye) or more recently more sociological substantial notions of complexity (Urry, Lash & 
Urry, Bell 2006). Theories of empire are a possible exception to this pattern (if they are not 
classed as a variation on hierarchy) as they posit a centre-periphery model that has been 
depicted and specified in various ways (see below). These models or theories have lived on 
the outskirts of or outside the discipline of IR of course, but have been prominent in other 
disciplines such as historical sociology and IPE (although this is beginning to show signs of 
changing – see Nexon & Wright 2007, MacDonald 2009). Additionally, „the network‟ as a 
picture, mentally formed, of world politics is a late but promising arrival to which we give 
more attention below.  
 
Thus, assuming Waltz‟ theory of theories as pictures, mentally formed, that underlay and 
structure various explanations of world politics – but challenging his claim that there are a 
limited range of such theories – we now consider briefly what theories we have at our 
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disposal when analysing world politics as social scientists. The aim here is not to 
comprehensively assess accounts of global politics, but to glean the pictorial theories of 
political space behind them. With the theory of theory outlined above, we gain a vantage 
point from which we get an overview and classification of familiar theories in the field 
without going via the usual IR-typology of Realism, Liberalism and Radicalism/Marxism. 
That trinity grew out of the debate about the international system model and is as such 
(post)international itself.  
 
Anarchy 
As a theory of world politics, anarchy is the familiar one of individual, self-contained units 
(states) that live separately yet within a „system‟. A system has in turn been defined by Bull 
as a situation in which connections between units are significant enough to force them to take 
each others‟ actions into account (1977). An anarchic system is, as we know in IR, not 
necessarily one of  permanent conflict or chaos but one in which there is no Leviathan and in 
which every unit is ultimately responsible for its own survival and formally equal to other 
units. Constructivists such as Wendt have made the point that not even balancing of power or 
security seeking is a necessary element of anarchy since this depends upon the character of 
the units and their notion of what the structure consists of (1999). In Waltz‟s analogy with 
micro-economics, firms in an oligopoly are assumed to be fundamentally like units living 
with similar imperatives, although they vary in size. Cutting to the bone then, anarchy is 
about a system of distinct but formally like units who govern themselves while taking 
account of „others‟ – indeed that is all that is pictured. The graphic depiction of anarchy is 
well known from Waltz 1979, emphasizing the formal equivalence of the units in a system 
and their internal ordering lacking a sovereign power with a monopoly on the (legitimate) use 
of force (Figure 1). This is the basic model of anarchy that Waltz claimed was the most 
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accurate theory or „prototype‟ of the international system (and later he claimed it was 
applicable to other kinds of units such as tribes, nations, oligopolisitc firms or street gangs 
(Waltz 1990: 37, quoted in Buzan and Little 2009)). If the pictorial theory of theory is 
adopted, this is the essence of his theory of anarchy: 
 
 
Figure 1 Waltz' model of anarchy (1979, 100) 
 
 
The circle represents the systemic effect, which affects the interactions of states and their 
attributes. N1, 2 and 3 are internally generated impulses from the states generating X1, X2, 
and X3 external effects, but the structure affects both. Because the units are assumed to be 
interested in survival and placed in a self-help environment, Waltz held that they would seek 
to maximise their relative power and from there he read off the idea of the balance of power 
and other classical realist themes regarding the function of the structure of anarchy. There is 
little point in revisiting such well-trodden territory, which can be read in Waltz or they key 
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texts of realist scholarship as well as any standard IR textbook (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 
2001).  
 
The significant point in the context of sorting through the available theories (pictures, 
mentally formed) of world politics is the idea suggested in Chapter 1 that the many additional 
variables offered by critics of the bald states-in-anarchy model offer in themselves no 
alternative theory of political structure. They rest their accounts on the model of anarchy with 
its distinction between domestic and foreign policy, state and non-state but emphasize 
additional variables: Neoliberal Institutionalists focus on institutions, regimes, non-state 
actors; Post-classical Realists reintroduce statesmanship and domestic political variables into 
the systemic model refined by Waltz; Neo-classical Realists introduce extra variables 
mediating between the anarchic structure and foreign policy such as culture or institutions; 
English School theorists view the system of states to be embedded in a society of states, etc.. 
Although these accounts of world politics in some way explicitly criticize the systemic model 
of anarchy, their critique confirms the model as the basic imaginary of international relations 
from which reality deviates in various ways. Constructivist scholars, such as Alexander 
Wendt,  who emphasize the constructed nature of the anarchic international system, contest 
how anarchy came and what it is made of but do not offer an alternative structural model and 
definitely not one that can be depicted. „Anarchy is what states make of it‟, but what else are 
actors making: hierarchies, empires, networks, polities, etc.? Even post-structuralists sooner 
offer deconstruction of the Inside/Outside distinction of the international system model than 
the construction of a new distinction (Walker 1993). On top of this explicit theorizing in 
terms of the model of anarchy, the standard jargon of international relations derives in large 
part from it.  
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Even so, not all accounts of world politics take their point of departure from that model. 
Wæver is, strictly speaking, wrong when he makes the point elsewhere that we cannot go 
from complexity to a description of the reality of the world. The only way we have of 
articulating the complex reality of world politics is to say that „the distinction between 
domestic and international has broken down‟ (2004:16). 
 
Hierarchy 
The other model mentioned (though not studied) by Waltz and easily recognized by all is the 
model of hierarchy. In Figure 2, X represents the hegemonic unit, and Y, Y1 and Z,   Z1 and 
Z2 represent subordinate units that can have different characteristics as X has a monopoly on 
the use of violence o maintains order by some other means (Lebow Tragic vision) and so 
allows for functional differentiation. This picture, mentally formed (though that happened at 
least as long ago as Hobbes‟ Leviathan), is in current discourse paradigmatically connected to 
the idea of statehood in which authority is organized in terms of the state having a monopoly 
on the (legitimate) use of force within the remit of a territory. In principle, hierarchy is more 
than this standard definition includes and can be based on other forms of power than a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, such as discipline (Parent & Erikson 2009, Larner & 
Walters 2004, Dean 1999). But hierarchy has typically figured as a model in IR in terms of 
the alter ego of the anarchic international system on the „inside‟ of the sovereign states that 
comprise the system.  So in essence, „in hierarchical systems, power is centralized in the 
hierarch‟ (Parent & Erikson 2009:132). 
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Figure 2 Model of Hierarchy (Corry 2006) 
 
 
Despite Waltz‟ dismissal of hierarchy as a model not applicable to world politics it has also 
been used to imagine or describe a global hierarchy. While political debate in the 1930s was 
awash with references to world government, the idea was long considered practically 
unrealisable and politically unpalatable (Weiss 2009). The end of the Cold War provided 
some renaissance of the idea of deploying the model of hierarchy in analysis of world 
politics. Eduard Luard wrote of „world society‟ as a „single, interrelated political organism,‟ 
or a „world political system‟ (1990: 4-5, 17, quoted in Ougaard 1999:2). Similarly Dieter 
Senghaas uses the terms „global governance‟ and „world domestic policy‟ (Weltinnenpolitik) 
interchangeably (1993), noting that global governance is a „tempting concept, since it 
presupposes the notion of the world as a unity‟ (1993:247). Earlier the idea of „international 
relations as a prismatic system‟ (Riggs 1961) suggested that the concept of the developmental 
or „prismatic state‟ could be borrowed from development theory (concerned with states with 
a variety of levels of development within them) to investigate whether the core ingredients of 
a developing „world polity‟ – i.e. evolving shared identities and institutions allowing for the 
authoritative allocation of values, and popular consensus on rules of the game worldwide – is 
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emerging. Conceptual tools applied to analysis of the international system were derived from 
analysis of domestic, hierarchic order (Rochester 1974:8).  
 
Today, neofunctionalist and neo-Marxist global state approaches provide the most explicit 
attempts to apply the model of a global hierarchy, though more in descriptive than 
prescriptive terms. Alexander Wendt speaks of the logical evolution towards a world state 
explicitly modelled on the „domestic‟ state as functions of governance spill-over creating a 
demand for ever larger political units (Wendt 2003). Martin Shaw provides the best known 
contemporary theory of a global state based on neo-marxist ideas about violence, legitimacy 
and state structure (see also Robinson 2001). Shaw is promising from a global polity 
perspective because globality for him involves a transformation of the national-international 
nexus itself rather than a simple tipping towards the international: „Accounts of 
transnationalism hardly amount to theories of globality‟ (Shaw 2000:89). Although states 
remain and inevitably form an important part of global politics, in a global setting „tensions 
[between national and international] reappear in novel terms, which are increasingly 
relativised by the greater consciousness of the global human whole‟ (Shaw 2000:26). Within 
this emerging globality, Shaw argues that global state functions are gradually becoming 
globalized. This creates a nascent western-global state „conglomerate‟ of powerful units 
centred on the lone superpower, the US, and shared institutions like NATO: 
„The globalized Western state-conglomerate, or global-Western state for short, 
is an integrated authoritative organization of violence which includes a large 
number of both juridically defined states and international interstate 
organizations.‟ (2000:199). 
 
The global or „western-global‟ state has internal structures strong enough to redefine ideas 
about national interest and sovereignty while it acts outwardly in relation to elements of 
world politics still outside it as a partially hegemonic bloc: „not only is western state power 
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exercised world-wide, but it has a general (if strongly contested) global legitimacy‟. 
(2000:200). For Shaw, other theories of global governance underestimate the „striking 
difference between nation-states within the West and outside it‟ (2000:202). A new 
distinction beyond the national-international is thus offered as fundamental: „the Western 
state functions as a single centre of military state power in relation to other centres‟ 
(2000:200).  
 
Similarly focused on the politics of globalization, though with a focus on a wider range of 
state functions than those related to violence and war-making, Morten Ougaard borrows 
concepts originally refined in domestic neo-marxist state theory such as „superstructure‟, 
„persistence function‟, and the „reproduction of relations of power‟. Ougaard‟s project is also 
motivated by a wish to go beyond the model of the state system as a modified anarchy and he 
urges „a holistic perspective on world politics as an integrated phenomenon‟ (2004:5). This 
he achieves in a powerful analysis of a growing global superstructure of institutions: „the rise 
of a global political superstructure can be theorized as the uneven and partial globalization of 
the various aspects of statehood. (2004:196.)‟. Like Shaw‟s, Ougaard‟s analysis leads him to 
identify a global state-like construction based on the major western powers and global 
institutions. For him the „global polity‟ is made up of: 
 
„the core of industrialized market democratic countries in an increasingly integrated 
institutional infrastructure of national governments and international institutions 
marked by dense contacts, routinized information exchange, mutual surveillance and 
peer pressure, strong analytical and statistical resources, and a capacity for 
development of joint strategies and policies‟ (p199). 
 
 
Shaw and Ougaard largely succeed in offering an alternative to standard accounts of 
(modified) international anarchy. They begin from a different unit of analysis than the model 
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of anarchy. Basing their account instead on hierarchy they posit a global state-agent with a 
(relatively) ordered and pacific inside and a relatively anarchic outside. Both theorists 
implicitly and explicitly measure the „global superstructure‟ in relation to the idea of a 
hierarchic state able to command resources, build institutions and secure legitimacy and 
loyalty. Ougaard‟s account of the global polity is openly based on a domestic analogy – 
something which he argues is legitimate, indeed indispensable, provided such domestic 
analogies are not used „uncritically‟ (2004:4). Both emphasize the „incomplete‟ nature of the 
global state which insulates somewhat against realist counterclaims about the continued 
primacy of state sovereignty and the persistence of an underlying anarchy, but also suggests 
that the global state process, over time, will or could be „completed‟. 
 
This is perfectly legitimate and thanks to a repertoire of state theory concepts both offer 
explanations and analysis of the globalization of power structures often lacking in 
economistic or sociology-oriented globalization perspectives that begin from the model of 
anarchy. But they do not fundamentally expand our range of political models beyond the 
familiar dichotomy of hierarchy and anarchy, transferring the model of hierarchy familiar 
from comparative politics and methodological nationalism to the global level. Both warn 
against the uncritical use of concepts developed in a domestic setting. Yet it is hard to see 
how their global model of hierarchy differs from that of standard domestic state theory. For 
Ougaard the global political system can now be viewed as an integrated whole with state-like 
qualities: „interests are articulated and aggregated, decisions are made values allocated and 
policies conducted through international or transnational political processes‟ (2004:5). The 
global state is for them, like the model of the domestic sovereign state, by definition 
relatively pacific internally, institutionalized, territorially anchored and possesses agent 
qualities, able to act towards an „outside‟. While this sheds light on important questions 
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concerning world politics, it also inevitably obscures other questions which are key to the 
idea of a global polity.  
 
Firstly, with global state theory there will be a strong propensity to find internal cohesion and 
„actorness‟ in a global state when envisaging it as a domestic state writ-large. The plausibility 
of the global state argument in fact depends on the internal cohesion of the bloc or the 
uniformity of the global superstructure and critics were for this reason quick to charge that 
the global state could easily break up, making it essentially a multilateral form of cooperation 
between states rather than a new state formation (Hirst 2001). A global state thus conceived is 
predicated on the weakening of nation-state constructs and excludes by definition radical 
opponents of the West. The global state is considered as a kind of actor rather than as a 
structure (unlike an anarchy and the theory of polity suggested below). Similarly, the idea of 
„global public goods‟ which also explicitly rests on an analogy between domestic public 
goods and global ones, assumes the existence of actors that share a common interest in 
internalizing externalities as well as general agreement as to what are externalities in the first 
place and who the legitimate stakeholders are (Kaul & Mondoza 2003). This is domestic 
hierarchy writ large. 
 
Secondly and linked to this is the fact that the idea of a global society hovers around the 
notion of a global state since state theory has assumed the rough coincidence of societies and 
states (societies creating states of a certain kind in traditional Marxist historical thinking, 
gaining autonomy from society in later iterations). Ougaard and Higgott identify a „growing 
sense of “community”‟ (Ougaard & Higgott 2002:3) as a central characteristic of what they 
see as an emerging Western global polity. Shaw‟s global state derives its cohesion in part 
from a common awareness of human society on a world scale („society becomes global when 
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this becomes its dominant, constitutive framework‟ 2000:12) and externally his global state 
has „a general (if strongly contested) global legitimacy‟ (2000:200). Even for the more 
institutionally focussed Ougaard the „global polity‟ is characterized by assumptions of 
internation cohesion: „dense contacts, routinized information exchange, mutual surveillance 
and peer pressure, strong analytical and statistical resources, and a capacity for development 
of joint strategies and policies‟ (2004:199). A global polity would in contrast be open to the 
idea of even extreme tension and strife within it and need not be based on a notion of shared 
principles or institutions (see Chapter 4).  
 
Thirdly, global state theory gives priority to institutions, institutionalisation and hierarchic 
bureaucracy. These are core connotations linked to the concept of a state. Shaw‟s emphasis 
on the shift towards consciousness of the world as one place is at the crux of his idea of 
„global‟, but neither global consciousness nor global discourse figure prominently in his idea 
of a global Western state bloc, which is rather based on control over means of violence. The 
same goes for Ougaard‟s global superstructure, which is conceived of mainly in terms of 
institutions. The polity approach offered here in contrast puts global discourse at the heart of 
the emerging global polity in terms of the social construction of global governance-objects 
and the way subjects put (or do not put) such objects at the heart of their political identities.  
 
Finally global state theory tends to bring with it certain assumptions concerning territoriality. 
The global state is for Shaw limited to the same area as the global-Western transnational 
socio-military formation maintaining a „territorial base‟ defined by „the areas controlled by its 
component state units‟ (2000:201). Like Shaw‟s, Ougaard‟s analysis leads him to identify a 
global state-like construction based on the major western powers and global institutions. 
Seyom Brown, in another conception of a „world polity‟, defines it as the totality of political 
Olaf Corry. Working paper, SGIR Stockholm September 2010 
23 
 
relations on the Earth exercising authoritative distribution of (certain) values across the globe 
(Brown 1996, 6). This brings a very wide concept of polity to bear in an attempt to 
understand the proliferation of trans-border processes, actors and identities without having to 
prove the existence of a unified set of institutions normally associated with the concept of a 
state. But it replicates on a planetary basis the conventional definition of politics as the 
authoritative distribution of values for a society within a territory (in this case the territory is 
the whole of the planet). (It also remains theoretically weak because a simple sum of the 
political relations going on on planet Earth would logically have existed at all times and 
therefore does not provide additional analytical leverage on what logic or inner workings or 
limits of a global polity were or when one could be said to have emerged). Reliance on the 
model of hiearchy appears to lead these theoreists to import the baggage of the state era in the 
form of the idea of territoriality. A global polity must be conceivable without such an 
assumption. 
 
In sum, using the model of the hierarchic domestic usefully points up certain features of 
world politics that tend to get neglected in the anarchy-based literature that highlights 
differences and divisions among states or complications to anarchy. After all, the inattention 
to hierarchy in mainstream International Relations is principled and systematic, not 
inadvertent (Lake 2009) and domestic analogies are one kind of antidote to this. But they 
have their own biases from its import of assumptions derived from domestic states in that the 
homogeneity of the quasi-global state is overrated just as domestic order has been idealized 
and contrasted international disorder (Walker 1993) and again the non-western or hostile 
political elements of global politics are written out of the narrative. The form of authority 
evoked by the global state model is that of legally sanctioned, territorially delimited rule 
ultimately backed by the use of force. This close association between the model of hierarchy 
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and the idea of a bounded „civil‟ society reflects the dominance of Westphalian thinking 
about the global state (Bartelson 2006). In terms of getting beyond the hierarchy-anarchy 
dichotomy, global state theory does not do it. 
 
Empire 
More promising is the deployment of models of empire to theorize global politics (Galtung 
1971, Hardt & Negri 2001, Callinicos 2009, Barkawi and Laffey 1999, Colas 2007, Munkler 
2007, Nexon & Wright 2007)). The basic model of political structure in such accounts is not 
a sovereign authority ruling a single jurisdiction or territory but, at its simplest, a core ruling 
various peripheries, usually at a distance and not solely through military coercion. The 
concept of empire usually, though not always, implies a wider set of social, cultural and 
political mechanisms than simple military dominance by which the centre controls the 
periphery although this broad notion of power is not what distinguishes a theory of empire 
from superficially similar theories of hegenmony or unipolarity, based on a theory of 
anarchy. Instead, empire can be differentiated from „hegemony‟ in terms of a different model 
of political structure. Analysis of hegemony and „imperial overstretch‟ touch on imperial 
themes and are quite common (e.g. Burbach & Tarbell 2004, Snyder 1991) but remain 
theorized with the premise of „states under anarchy‟ and focussed on the hegemon rather than 
addressing the imperial character of international relations more generally (Barkawi 2009). 
Hegemonic stability theory, for example, implies dominance of one unit over other formally 
equal ones (a uni-polar anarchy in effect) while empire relaxes the assumption of formal 
equality between units and depicts satellites attached to a centre in varying ways (Munkler 
2007:6, Nexon & Wright 2007). The model of empire theorizes dependent units as segregated 
from one another and governed through different kinds of contract, isolating them from each 
other in a divide and rule logic as opposed to the balance of power or bandwagoning logic of 
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states in anarchy (Nexon and Wright 2007). Nexon and Wright, building on earlier diagrams 
and theories of imperialism developed by Galtung (1971:89) and dependency theorists depict 
empire as a „rimless hub-and-spoke‟ structure, where the imperial authority maintains ties 
with each satellite without them connecting up together. The interests of the centre or elite of 
the imperial power chimes with the peripheral elites. Each periphery is isolated from the 
other ones. The dialectical view of history where identities are seen as relational is a 
fundamental critique of the Newtonian worldview of discrete colliding units that underpins 
the states in anarchy model. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Model of Empire (Reproduced from Nexon & Wright 2007, 257) 
 
 
Instead of no unit differentiation as in the model of anarchy, the theory of empire predicts 
differential treatment of satellites and different qualities in ties between centre and various 
peripheries. This prevents peripheries in having similar interests and in making common 
cause against the imperial power. Divide and rule, it is claimed, is the primary logic in this 
kind of political structure and dependency and autonomy are the key dynamics. Whereas 
„hegemony‟ naturally fixes focus onto the hegemonic unit, a theory of „empire‟ shifts 
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attention to the relations constituting dependency and domination. The favourite subject 
matter of hegemonic power theory based on the model of anarchy has been major wars 
between great powers thus obscuring smaller (but significant) wars and more pervasive or 
subtle exploitative relations between the strong and the weak (Barkawi 2009). As such, 
theories of empire, though largely written on the edge of mainstream IR theory, are an 
efficient if underused antidote to the Westphalian bias of the „states under anarchy‟-model 
(Laffey & Barkawi 2002) as well as the domestic idea of hierarchy just identified. According 
to Barkawi, „the modern world took shape around the imperial encounter between Europeans 
and the Americas, Africa and Asia‟ yet „security studies and IR lack a coherent and 
developed body of inquiry on questions of empire‟ (Barkawi 2009:2).  
 
Despite Waltz‟ dismissal of theories other than anarchy and hierarchy, empire appears to 
conform to his criteria of theory: a picture, mentally formed, that helps explain a limited field. 
Empire is a model that implies a dominant core and a coerced periphery, which, if the task 
here is to move beyond the models of anarchy and hierarchy in analysis of global politics, 
empire is only of limited use. Empire, like global state theory, arguably remains a version of 
the model of hierarchy. It defines political structure in terms of relations of super- and 
subordination albeit without the unitary and territorial assumptions written into discourses of 
sovereignty. Furthermore, territoriality often remains inscribed within the complex of ideas 
that the term empire activates. The concept of „global empire‟ would thus for most people 
imply domination of a centre over the entire or all parts of the globe. Hardt and Negri 
suppose this with their notion of Empire as a worldwide but decentred power structure 
(although they now see such a thing only as „emerging‟) (2001:20), though they also blend 
this with the idea of a global „network‟ (see below). 
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Other metaphors 
Besides anarchy, hierarchy and empire, other concepts are being drawn upon in the effort to 
characterise world politics beyond hierarchy or anarchy, the best example being the recently 
popular concept of network. The network concept has gained in popularity particularly via 
the spread of ideas about the information society and theories of globalization that emphasize 
interconnectedness and new or dynamic social and technological constellations (e.g. Castells 
1996). International relations are being seen explicitly through the prism of social network 
theory or using „network‟ as a metaphor for a kind of political structure that is neither 
characterized by hierarchy nor anarchy but by loose and changing links and nodes (Keck & 
Sikkink 1998, Castells 1996, Slaughter 2004). For Keck and Sikkink, for example, 
Transnational Advocacy Networks affect state behaviour by agenda-setting, campaigning and 
mobilization across borders. Many kinds of actors make contact with each other on single 
issue basis or in alliances that change, linking non-state groups and states in new ways 
(1998). As a metaphor, network appears useful to capture such non-hierarchical information 
and value-based political structures that straddle „traditional‟ (i.e. state) boundaries or ones 
that cross the domestic-international threshold (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Anne-Marie 
Slaughter points to networks of governmental organizations that link up alongside the 
traditional state-to-state diplomatic links (2004). World culture and world polity research 
emphasizes the networked character of the global polity as a “unitary and social system, 
increasingly integrated by networks of exchange, competition, and cooperation” (Boli & 
Thomas 1997:172, Beckfield 2010). Others have highlighted how social network theory can 
highlight the key role of social entrepreneurs who exploit „network-holes‟ allowing them to 
influence and reorganize the structure of international politics (Goddard 2009). Perhaps most 
famously Hardt and Negri suggest that a global network of power and resistance, which they 
(in this context confusingly) label „Empire‟ has emerged out of a hyper-capitalist modernity 
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(2001, 2004). This worldwide power structure is depicted as inherently complex, „without a 
head‟ and with shifting nodes of power and counter-power, empire being challenged by „the 
Multitude‟ – an equally networked and centreless movement of social forces. For them 
„network has become a common form that tends to define our ways of understanding the 
world and acting in it‟ (Hardt & Negri 2004,142). 
 
While there are social phenomena that fit the network metaphor well, the question is whether 
it constitutes a theory of world politics in the sense of theory specified above – ie. a picture, 
mentally formed, that orders and makes sense of a complex reality specifying relations 
between units? Organizational theory has hailed networks as the third organizational structure 
after hierarchy and the market (roughly equivalent to anarchy which Waltz of course 
moulded on economic theory) (Powell 1990). But despite this, and despite their value in 
imagining social relations anew, such uses of the network term remain unspecified in 
structural terms, difficult to picture, and typically rely on complexity (often explicitly defined 
in relation to the supposed simplicity of hierarchy or anarchy) for what analytical power they 
have. Is there, then, a theory of networks if theory is understood in the Waltzian sense? 
Networks are defined simply as a set of units (or nodes) with connections between them 
(Castells 1996:501, Kadushin 2004:3). We know that unlike hierarchies these nodes-with-
connections constellations are not fixed or constituted by a dominant node or sovereign. 
Unlike anarchies the nodes in a network are not necessarily functionally equivalent or in 
competition. Beyond that, however, networks can in theory be structured in any number of 
ways and any use of the network concept needs to be followed up by a specification of the 
structure. Slaughter defines governmental networks very broadly as any „pattern of regular 
and purposive relations among like government units‟ (2004:14). That something is „a 
network‟ thus tells us little of the nature of the relations between units except possibly that 
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they are not fixed or hierarchical (since we would then call them „structures‟ or „hierarchies‟, 
respectively) although it does allow us to investigate empirically how the nodes in a network 
are arranged (e.g. Beckfield 2010). Keck and Sikkink do specify their understanding of 
networks more fully defining them as essentially cooperative organizations „characterized by 
voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange‟ (1998:8). But 
this positive vision of networks is not theoretically founded and it remains unclear why a 
network could not coerce or contain vertical patterns of communication and exchange – the 
coercive (if complex) nature of the global networks for Empire is the crux of Hardt and 
Negri‟s argument, indicating that networks need not be voluntary, reciprocal or egalitarian: 
whereas The Multitude is „an open and expansive network in which all differences can be 
expressed freely and equally, a network that provides the means of encounter so that we can 
work and live in common‟ (2004:xiv), „Empire spreads globally its network of hierarchies 
and divisions that maintain order through new mechanisms of control and conflict‟ 
(2004:xiii). 
 
For the purposes of this argument it suffices to point out that a network can assume any 
number of basic morphologies and cannot thus be likened to a theory of political structure 
such as hierarchy. As such it is also not suited to the function of providing a new picture, 
mentally formed way of simplifying reality. As Alison Cavanagh puts it „(w)here networks 
are called upon as an explanatory device, this is usually in the context of an appeal to 
complexity and the need for further information, rather than a different schema‟ (Cavanagh 
2007: 50). In fact, apart from the vague connotations of cooperation attached to it, the 
network concept functions very much in the same way as the concept of „system‟ understood 
as a set of interconnected units. Figure 4 depicting a social network below illustrates the 
point.  
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Figure 4 Example of a social network diagram (DarwinPeacock, Collective Commons License, Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sna_large.png) 
 
 
To say that a global network exists is to say that units interact on a global scale which is 
equivalent to the idea of a global system. This stays at a level of abstraction above that of 
anarchy, hierarchy and empire.  
 
Other metaphors exist that attempt to capture non-hierarchical yet also non-anarchic political 
structures. Saskia Sassen‟s use of the term „global assemblages‟ arguably provides a new way 
of conceiving of political units, suggesting novel constellations of key elements of the nation 
state (territory, authority and rights) but is deliberately left un-theorized (Sassen 2006:3). 
Geographers such as Nigel Thrift work creatively with new forms of social space, also 
making use of the „assemblage‟ term defining it in terms of familiar elements put together in 
a novel way that „breathes life into the elements that compose it and induces a novel 
perception of reality‟ (Thrift 2001:421). However, to qualify as a theory of political structure 
such notions need to specify how such constellations are put together. Not all assemblages 
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are hierarchies or polities, in other words, and so this concept is also of a different order to 
the one we are looking for here. Sassen‟s work on a „global city‟ uses city as a metaphor, 
appealing to the city state as a geographic but not sovereign centre with links to other like 
units. Again „city‟, though an intriguing metaphor, is not a generic structure specifying how 
elements relate to each other.  
 
Others, like Ruggie, have employed compound terms like the concept of heteronomy to 
denote interwoven and overlapping jurisdictions (Ruggie 1998, 23-24. See also Onuf & Klink 
1989). „Heterarchy‟ has likewise been defined as a structure in which each element is either 
unranked relative to other elements, or possesses the potential for being ranked in a number 
of different ways (Crumley 1995) typically applied to structures such as the EU (Neyer 2003, 
689) or Medieval Christendom (Ruggie 1998: 149). However, with heterarchy we learn that 
„political authority is neither centralized (as under conditions of hierarchy) nor decentralized 
(as under conditions of anarchy) but shared‟ (Neyer 2003, 689). Political authority is shared, 
but no picture of how this sharing takes place is offered – at least not in the model of 
heterarchy. In terms of theories of political structure we are little wiser on what a heterarchy 
is and we are left with largely negative definitions.  
 
Finally, society has also been used as a metaphor for describing the character  (or rather the 
context) of world politics. Again, „global society‟ or „world society‟ makes intuitive sense 
and suggests a unit of analysis that may be deemed plausible or useful to those who buy into 
the idea of persistent world-wide social relations and integration. But it does not describe a 
theory of politics in our sense. Instead it provides a thick notion of an integrated global social 
body with some form of community of shared Gemeinschaft norms or – in the thinner 
Gesellschaft sense – a more abstract world system of connected parts (Albert 2007:171). Both 
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uses of society indicate interconnectedness without specifying the structure of the 
interconnections, i.e. without specifying a theory of political structure. For example, the 
World Society-concept (Buzan 2004) has been used to suggest that an increasingly dense 
system of interaction between non-state actors, i.e. a „non-state system‟, is also developing 
providing common norms, identities and regimes – a society – regulating the behaviour of the 
system of non-state units. This Buzan dubs „world society‟, in what is essentially a parallel 
notion to the more famous English School notion of „international society‟– the set of norms, 
values and institutions within which the international system of states is embedded (Bull 
1977). Both these English School concepts are based on some idea of norms and perspectives 
shared by members of the system, i.e. a thicker concept of society, that constitutively relies 
on a form of normative integration (Albert 2009:127, see also Albert 1997, 2004). The idea of 
normative global integration excludes opponents of any global political entity marginalising 
the „dark side‟ – or more generally any actor not a member of the global western 
conglomeration (see Shaw 2000). This is a part of a global polity in the terms advanced 
below. Moreover, as mentioned, „society‟, though a useful concept for considering normative 
integration globally, is not a theory of political structure. 
 
The more radical-liberal notion of „global civil society‟ adopts the „civil society‟   concept 
and deploys it to understand changes in global politics where non-state and trans-border 
movements and actors have played a role in the affairs of states and institutions of global 
governance (Keane 2003, Kaldor 2003). The use of „civil society‟ has been criticized for 
bringing assumptions of a civil, pacific and benevolent sphere derived from a conceptual 
universe reliant on the existence of a (liberal) state into the global sphere where no such state 
can be found (Bartelson 2006). But it has also been defended as a step in the transformation 
of discourses about the state, power and resistance in globalized societies (Corry 2006). 
Olaf Corry. Working paper, SGIR Stockholm September 2010 
33 
 
Regardless of whether the term global civil society amounts to a domestic fallacy or a 
globalist discursive move, it does not pretend to be a theory of global politics as such. Instead 
it resembles more a specification of the theory of states under anarchy: transboundary non-
state actors are seen not as a sphere of politics that runs parallel to the state system as in 
Buzan‟s terms, but rather as a „society‟ with shared norms and values that engages in a 
process of negotiation (or confrontation) with states and state-based centres of power (such as 
international organisations and leading states) (Kaldor 2003). As Martin Shaw puts it: 
“international relations theory must itself generate new synthetic approaches, which do more 
than integrate societies in a subordinate role into a perspective centered on the state system” 
(Shaw 2000b). 
 
 
Conclusion:  
Thus, although all these theories (hierarchy and possibly empire), metaphors (network, 
assemblage, city, society) and compounds (heterarchy, heteronomy) help us grapple with the 
in adequacies of the model of anarchy in some way, none of them have provided a theory of 
world politics that is not ultimately dependent predicated on the models of anarchy or 
hierarchy – the two models that make up the backbone of the dominant narrative of system of 
internally hierarchic states arranged anarchically. Moving beyond post-internationalist 
epistemological positions is thus unlikely as long as pictorial theories of political structure 
that stem from the Westphalian age set the terms of description and hypothesis-generation in 
IR. The discipline of IR, while it will continue to grapple with „anomalies‟ and import 
sociological theories to analyse the nature of social relations in „international relations‟, will 
not move far beyond a post-international paradigm.  
Theories of globalization are taught in university courses as a subsection of IR.  
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To finish off, one illustration of the way the international theories (hierarchy and anarchy) 
perpetuate international thinking can be offered. Efforts aimed at finding a new model of 
political structure and therefore a new fundamental distinction to proceed from has already 
been suggested by a few approaches (explored below) but called for most explicitly by the 
global polity approach
i
 (Higgott & Ougaard 2002, Brassett & Higgott 2003). This 
recommended a „reversal of strategy for theory-building‟ (Ougaard & Higgott 2002: 30): 
instead of always beginning from the model of the international system and then adding n 
number of complications, its authors urged us to begin with „a conception of one world 
political system, or an aspect of world politics, and then add the complications arising from 
the persistent reality that this system lacks a unified authority structure and has formally 
sovereign states among its fundamental building blocks‟ (Ougaard & Higgott 2002:30). They 
saw this reversal as a necessary methodological move to avoid framing global politics in 
terms of modified anarchy rather than because they were claiming the wholesale 
disappearance of the state system: „the point is not that states have become irrelevant (…) but 
that the intellectual starting point is the system as a whole‟ (ibid.). An alternative analytical 
starting point would short-circuit the statist wiring of IR providing the option of a fresh look 
at contemporary world politics. They were not alone in thinking that without a new model, 
statism‟s „impoverished pictures of morphology‟ as Martin Coward puts it, remains at the 
root of a sterile state-versus-global debate (2006). This pits the new as the inverse of the old, 
maintains the future of the state as the central question of globalisation, and perpetuates the 
conceptual universe and questions that came out of the old models centred on sovereignty and 
the security of like units in an anarchic world.  
 
However, even an approach such as the global polity approach that aims very self-
consciously to go beyond post-internationalism struggles to free itself of the usual post-
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international narrative. For Richard Higgott and Morten Ougaard a global polity is deemed to 
consist of a combination of a) interconnectedness between whole societies (rather than just 
international diplomacy between states), b) an ever thickening web of international 
institutions, c) the weakening of the nation-state as a container of politics and d) the increased 
relevance of „discourses of globality‟ (Ougaard and Higgott, 2002:2-13). Although motivated 
to „develop a notion of totality that transcends the state-centred perspective in a conscious 
theoretical fashion‟ (Ougaard, 2002:30) the first three of these criteria are precisely 
complications to the international model while the last one remains underspecified and 
underdeveloped. In short: the promise of a methodological reversal – to find an alternative 
theory to start out from „a conception of one world political system, or an aspect of world 
politics‟ – has not been honoured. The post-international problem has not be tackled head-on 
through a search for an alternative model, „polity‟ essentially implying modified anarchy or 
incomplete global hierarchy.  I have attempted to provide a generic and pictorial theory of 
polity  elsewhere by suggesting a new definition of polity – the term „polity‟ having already 
begun to fill the need for a term that helps us speak about political units without activating 
the models of the Westphalian age (Corry 2010).  
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i
 Global polity writers are not alone in trying to move beyond the state system-model but their idea is explored 
here as the most theoretically conscious attempt to go beyond the post-international perspective. 
